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In the Suprente Court of the 
State of Utah 
ROGER FARRER, et al., ~ 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, ( 
vs. 
VIVIAN D. JOHNSON, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE 
NO. 8076 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
These three cases., civil numbered 16,935, 16,936, and 
16,937, by stipulation of the parties, were consolidated for 
trial and were tried jointly on December 15 and 16, 1952. 
The plaintiffs in each of their respective amended complaints 
claimed title to the described lands and sought to have title 
quieted. In their respective answers the defendants denied 
plaintiffs' claim of title to said lands and counterclaimed 
in each case that they were the owners in possesion there-
of. Defendants further claimed plaintiffs' respective actions 
were barred by statutes of limitations. The court made and 
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree in 
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2. 
each case in favor of defendants. From these judgments 
the plaintiffs have appealed. We will hereinafter refer to 
appellants as plaintiffs and respondents as defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the trial it was undisputed that the land described 
in each of plaintiffs' amended complaints adjoins the Utah 
Lake Meander Line and extends South thereof to the wa-
ter's edge of Utah Lake. Also, these lands border the lands 
described in defendants' counterclaims which lie North of 
said Meander Line. The disputed lands are popularly ·known 
in this community as Utah Lake "accretion ground." (De-
fendants' Exhibit 2). (R. 69-70). 
The disputed lands were never patented by the United 
States of America or the State of Utah, and none of the 
parties hereto deraign title from a patentee thereof. (De-
fendants' Exhibit 3) (R. 70, 71, 72 and 151). 
The land to the North of the said Utah Lake Meander 
Line was patented by the United States of America to one 
Simon P. Eggertson in 1872. Defendants deraign title to 
these patented grounds through mesne conveyances from 
this patentee, as shown in the Abstracts received in evi-
dence as defendants' Exhibits 4 and 5. The Abstract, Ex· 
hibit -4, shows the descent of title to defendants in cases 
16,935 and 16,936 in part, and the Abstract, defendants' 
Exhibit 5, shows the descent of title to defendants in case 
16,.93-6. in part and case 16,937. These patented lands now 
owned and possessed by defendants lie immediately North, 
and,. with the exception of a narrow strip along the Mean-
der _Line, hereinafter noted, they immediately adjoin the 
said accretion ground on the North. Defendants' prede-
cessor, Simon P. Eggertson, conveyed most of these lands 
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in defendants' chain of title November 6, 1873. Defend-
ants' Exhibit 4, Entry 3, and Defendants' Exhibit 5, Entry 
2). It should be noted that the Warranty Deed from Simon 
P. Eggertson to George T. Peay, from which ploinaiffs at-
tempt to deraign title, was dated June 16, 1883, some 10 
years after the conveyance from the patentee to defend-
ants' predecessor. Defendants described these patented 
lands in the first paragraph of the descriptions contained 
in their respective counterclaims. Defendants' lands are 
platted within the red lines shown on dfendants' Exhibit 2, 
and their relative position to the disputed lands is also there 
shown. 
As indicated above, the disputed lands lying adjacent 
to defendants' said patented lands and South of the Mean-
der Line extending to the water edge of the Lake are known 
as "accretion ground." There has never been any United 
States or Utah State patents issued covering these lands. 
Plaintiffs seek to deraign title in each case, other than 16-,-
935, from Simon P. Eggertson, as patentee. Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibits A, B, C, Entries 1 and 2 of each). But the said E'g-
gertson Patent did not cover any of the lands described in 
the said George T. Peay deed. (Defendants' Exhibit 3). 
The lands described in this Eggertson-Peay deed all lie 
South of the Meander Line, and were never patented at all. 
Plaintiffs' claim is based principally upon tax titles in 
each of their cases. The plaintiffs in cases 16,936 and 16,-. 
937, after procuring their tax titles from Utah County, did 
procure quit-claim deeds from the succesors to George T. · 
Peay, to whom the lands described in those cases were dis-
tributed in the George T. Peay probate proceedings. (Plain-· 
tiffs' Exhibits B and C). But in 16,935 no such quit-claim 
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4 
deed was procured, and plaintiffs rely absolutely on the tax 
title. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). 
The witness Maurice Bird, Utah County Treasurer, and 
his uncontradicted evidence establishes that the assessment 
rolls in his office, of which he is the official custodian, show-
ing the tax sales on the properties described in the respec-
tive complaints for the years when the tax sales were made, 
1930 through 1937, contain no Auditor's Affidavit and that 
there was no evidence that any had ever been attached. (R. 
192-105). 
Plaintiffs made no claim in these suits to the lands ly-
ing North of the .Utah Lake Meander Line. There seems 
to be a small strip of land lying immediately North of the 
Meander Line and bounding defendants' patented ground 
on the South which was not conveyed by Simon P. Eggert-
son to defendants' predecessors. (Defendants' Exhibit 2). 
Title to this narrow strip still rests in the Simon P. Eggert-
son estate. But that it was understood to have been con-
veyed to defendants' predecessors is shown by an abortive 
attempt to convey it in 1901 by the Simon P. E.ggertson 
heirs to the defendants' predecessor, Thomas L. Vmcent. 
(Defendants' Exhibit 7) (R. 138). In any event, defend-
ants and their predecessors have always occupied this strip 
along with their other lands. (R. 113-149). 
Defendants and their predecessors in title have at all 
times paid all the taxes levied and assessed against the pat-
ented part of their disputed lands. (R. 118 and 136) (De-
fendants' Exhibit 6). The accretion part, the disputed 
lands, has never been assessed to them, and they had no 
knowledge of the disputed lands being assessed for taxes to 
any one until these lawsuits were commenced. (R. 118, 
119, 137, 140-141). It is undisputed that comparable ac-
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cretion land in the same general area to the East of defend-
ants' farm has never been assessed for taxation purposes. 
Defendants and their predecessors have been in actual, 
peaceable, open, notorious, exclusive, and uninterrupted 
possession of the disputed lands under claim of title adverse 
to all the world for more than seven years prior to the com-
mencement of these actions, and for upwards of 50 years 
prior thereto (R. 113-149); and that all during that period 
defendants and their predecessors have fenced and main-
tained same, cultivated, cropped, and have made large ex-
penditures theren for irrigation and drainage purposes. 
The said lands lying between the Lake water edge and the 
Meander Line constituted an average area of about 70 acres 
during more than 50 years last past. (R. 11, 135). The 
defendants and their predecessors during all of that period 
have protected it by a substantial enclosure, cultivated and 
improved it, and have expended labor and money on it for 
irrigation purposes amounting to about $2,000.00, or about 
$28.57 per acre. (R. 75-83, 87-90, 94-97, 106-113, 115-117, 
130-135). 
That defendants' predecessors, Thomas L. Vincent and 
Ralph Vincent, his son, defended legal actions over the West 
fence boundary line of the disputed lands, once in 1801, 
which controversy was settled by agreement (Defendants' 
Exhibit 4, Entry 13), once in 1942, where damages to crops 
growing on the disputed accretion ground was recovered by 
them (See Ralph Vincent v. Federal Land Bank, et al., Civil 
No. 12,230, Trial Court), and also when one Jesse Evans was 
put off the land when he attempted to assert a right under 
a State of Utah lease in the 1930's. (R. 130, 132, 137). 
All three of the plaintiffs' cases were filed February 4, 
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1952, and neither the plaintiffs nor their prdecessors have 
ever been in possession of same. (R. 4, 161, 181). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO ERROR 
IN FAILING TO QUIET TITLE TO THE LAN!D IN 
QUESTION IN PLAINTIFFS. 
(a) Th Tax Sale Proceedings In Each Of The Instant 
Cases Were Fatally Defective Because The Required Audi-· 
tor's Affidavit Was Never Attached To The Pertinent As-
sessment Rolls. 
(b) Apart From The Void Tax Titles The Claims of 
Plaintiffs In The Instant Cases Are Barred By The Provi-
sions Of Our Law Requiring Them To Be "Seised Or Pos-
sessed Of The Property Within Seven Years Before The 
Commencement Of Th-e Action''. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT DilD NOT COMMIT 
ERROR BY FAILING TO FIND AND FORECLOSE 
LIENS FOR TAXES PAID BY P~NTIFFS ON 
THE LANDS IN QUESTION AFTER HOLDING THEIR 
CLAIMED TAX TITLES VOIID. 
POINT ITI. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
FOIUND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND QUIETED 
THEIR TITLE TO THE iDISPUTED LANDS. 
(a) Defendants Record Title To Adjacent Patented 
Lands Entitled Them To The Disputed Lands Under The 
Accretion Doctrine. 
(b) Defendants Acquired Title To The Disputed Lands 
By Adverse Possession Thereof For Upwards Of 50 Year.s. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COiURT MADE NO ERROR 
IN FAILING TO QUIET TITLE TO THE LAND IN 
QUESTION IN PLAINTIFFS. 
Upon this record, and there is no substantial dispute in 
the evidence, it is defendants' position that the plaintiffs' 
claim of title to the disputed land fails, and that defend-
ants should be adjudged to be the owners thereof and their . 
title quieted. 
(a) The Tax Sale Proceedings In Each Of The Intant 
Cases Were Fatally Defective Because The Required Audi-
tor's Affidavit Was Never Attached To The Pertinent As-
sessment Rolls. 
The plaintiffs' tax title to the disputed lands is bad in 
each case, and their claims based thereon must fail. Tax 
titles to be valid must be based on tax assessment and sale, 
procedures strictly in accordance with the statutes provid-
ing thereor. Whoever sets up a tax title must show that 
all the requirements of the law have been complied with. 
Bolognese v. Anderson, et al., (1935) 87 U. 450, 44 P2d. 
706, and other Utah cases cited in the .Utah Report at page 
453. The Tax Deed made in accordance with the provisions 
of either 59-10-64(5) or 59-10-62, U. C. A., 1953, is prima 
facie evidence of al proceedings subsequent to the prelim-
inary sale. However, the Auditor's Affidavit required by 
la\V to be attached to the assessment roll in which the tax 
sale is recorded is a condition precedent to a valid Tax Deed 
based thereon. Telonis v. Staley, et al., (1943) 104 U. 537, 
at pages 544-5, 144 P2d. 514. Jenkins v. Morgan (1948) 
113 U. 534, at page 540, 196 P2d. 871. In each of the in-
stant cases it was proved conclusively from the evidence of 
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Maurice Bird, the ,Utah County Treasurer, that no affidavit 
was attached to the assessment rolls in which the tax sales 
of any of plaintiffs' lands appear for the years 1930 through 
1937, and there was no evidence that such affidavits had 
been so attached. This evidence was held to be conclusive 
in Jenkins v. Morgan; supra. In that case the-County Treas-
urer and his deputy testified they had examined all assess-
ment rolls for 1917 and 1939 and found no Auditor's Affi-
davits attached thereto and no evidence of such affidavits 
ever having been so attached. The court held that this Wl-
contradicted evidence was sufficient to support a finding 
that the affidavits were not attached to the assessment rolls 
as required by law. A new presumption was here found to 
have been established that officers will perform their duties 
and if the document cannot be found where it ought to be 
under the law, that the same never existed, the court say-· 
ing, pages 541-2, Utah Report: 
. "The record shows the testimony of the County 
Treasurer and his 'Deputy that they had examined all as .. 
sessment :rolls for 1917 and 1937 and had failed to find 
· any auditor's affidavits attached thereto or any appear-
ance of there ever having been any auditor's affidavits 
so attached. This testimony stands uncontradicted and 
under the rule adopted in Tree v. White, supra, the evi-
dence is sufficient to support the finding of the trial 
court. In that case we adopted the rule found in Hall 
v. Kellogg, 16 Mich. 135, as follows. 
"'The law prsumes that all officers entrusted with 
the custody of public files and records, will perform 
their official duty by keeping them safely in their offi-
ces. Where a paper is not found where, if in existence, 
it ought to be deposited or recorded, the presumption 
therefore arises that no such document has ever been . 
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in existence: * * * Until this presumption ·'is re-
butted, it must stand as proof of such non-existence' " 
(171 P.2d 400) ." 
It follows that the tax title in each of plaintiffs' cases 
much fail because the Auditor's Affidavit was never attached 
. . ' 
to. the pertinent assessment rolls ·as required by law.' ~nas7 
much as plaintiffs do not claim title as having descended 
to them from George T. Peay in connection with case 16,-
935, the failure of the tax title therein is ·conch.tsiv~ and pre-
cludes their recovery in that case. 
(b) Apart From The Void Tax Titles The ClaiJ?S Of_ 
Plaintiffs In The Instant Cases Are Barred By The Provi-
sions Of Our Law Requiring Them roBe "Seised Or Pos-
, ' . 
sessed Of The Property Within Seven Years :Before The 
CoQl~~ncenient . Of The Action." · . . . . . · 
The plaintiffs' respective claims of title in these. suits 
are barred by the provisions of the statute_ of limitations 
hereinafter set forth. These are actions brought for the re-
covery of real property within the meaning of Sections 78-
12-5 and 6, U. C. A., 1953, which provide as follows: 
. "No action for the recovery of .real property or for 
the possession thereof shall be maintained, unle~s it 
appears that .the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or pre-
decessor was seized or posses?ed of the property in ques-
tion \vithin seven years before the commencement of 
the action." 
"No cause of action, or defense or counter claim 
. to an. action,, founded upon the title to real property or 
to rents or profits out of the same, shall be effectual, 
unless it appears that the person prosecuting the action, 
or interposing the defense or counterclaim, or under 
whose title the action is prosecuted or defense or coun-
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10 
terclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor or gran-
tor of such person was seized or possessed of the prop. 
erty in question within seven years 'before the commit-
ting of the act in respect to which such action is pr~ 
secuted or defense or counterclaim made." 
Plaintiffs are barred under either or both of the fore-
going sections for the reason that they have never been 
"seised or possessed" of the property to which they seek 
to quiet their title within seven years before the commence-
ment of their actions or before the committing of the act 
in respect to which the actions are prosecuted. The plain-
tiffs, nor their predecessors, have never been "seised or 
possessed" within the meaning of these statutes. A person 
with the bare legal title, to say nothing of void tax title, is 
not seised or possessed as required ·by this law. In 38 Words 
and Phrases, page 513, the term "seised" is defined, quot-
ing a Minnesota case, as follows: 
"The title of the owner of a freehold estate is de-
scribed by the word 'seisin', or 'seisin in fee'; yet in a 
proper legal sense the holder of the legal title is not 
'seised' until he is fully invested with ·possession, actual 
or constructive. When there is no adverse possession, 
the title draws to it the possession. There can be but 
one actual seisin, and this necessarily includes posses~ 
sion; and hence an actual possession in hostility to the 
true owner works a disseisin. Thus, in a statute limit-
ing the time for the commencement of actions to re-
cover real property, unless the plaintiff was seised or 
possessed of the premises within a certain time, the 
term 'seised' is not used in contradistinction to 'pos-
sessed', so as to admit of an interpretation that the 
legal title or ownership only would be sufficint to pre-
vent the statute running as against the true o\vner, 
though a stranger be in the. actual occupancy-'pedis 
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11 
possessione'-of the land in dispute. Seymour v. Carli, 
16 N. W. 495, 31 Minn. 81." 
The Minnesota case has been reaffirmed on this par-
ticular point in Mellenthin v. Brantman (1941) (Minn.) 1 
N. W. 141, at page 143. 
The ,Utah statute 78-12-7, U. C. A., 1953, cited by coun-
sel (App. Br. 25) and Bank of Vernal v. Uintah County, et 
al., U. , 250 P2d. 581 (App. Br. 26) con-
struing same in connection with 78-12-5 and 6, U. C. A., 
1953, affirm the rule of the foregoing Minnesota cases. Syl-
abus 5 of the Pacific report reflects the holding of the court 
in the Bank of Vernal case, pages 581-2: 
"In quiet title action brought by a bank which had 
purchased involved realty at mortgage foreclosure sale. 
and was entitled to presumption of possession under 
statutory provision that in action for recovery or re-
alty or possession thereof, person establishing legal title 
shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof with-
in time required by law, and that occupancy thereof by 
another shall be deemed to have been in subordination 
to legal title, unless realty has been held and possessed 
adversely to legal title for seven years prior to com-
mencement of action, defendant's evidence was insuf-
ficient to rebut presumption of possession which inured 
to bank. U. C. A .. , 1943, 104-2-5 to 104-2-7." 
In the instant cases there could be no presumption of 
title in the owner under 78-12-7 because "it appears that the 
property had been held and possessed adversely to such legal 
title for seven years before the commencement of the ac-
tion." Indeed, on this record such adverse possession ex-
isted for upwards of 50 years before this action was com-
menced. 
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12 
The record in the instant cases shows that neither the 
plaintiffs nor any of their predeeessots have ever· been seised 
or possessed of the disputed lands at any time. Their 
claims, ther~fore, are barred by ·the foregoing limitations 
statutes. · 
POINT ll. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
·ERROR BY FAILING TO FIND AND FORECLOSE 
LIENS FOR TAXES PAID BY PLAINTIFFS ON 
THE LANDS IN QUESTION. AFTER HOILDING THEIR 
CLAIMED. ·TAX TITLES VOID. 
In their brief plaintiffs are claiming that they are en-
titled to a lien upon the disputed lands for amounts paid 
Utah County for same and rely upon 59-10-65, U. C. A., 
1953, asking that· same be foreclosed if the Court finds their 
tax titles bad. We beiieve this contention it a tacit admis-
sion of defend~nts' position that plaintiffs' tax titles are in-
valid.. However, it .is our contention, despite 59-10-65, that 
plaintiffs have no .tax lien against these-lands, and conse-
quently there is nothing to be foreclosed. Let's briefly ex-
amine this statute and its backgr~imd. 
Section 59-10-65, U. ·C. A., 1953, was passd by the 1951 
Legislature (L. 1951, Ch. 96) as a ne\v Section 80-10-68.1 
in U. C. A., 1943, and it provides as follows: 
"Every person who has purchased or shall here-
after purchase any invalid tax title to any real prop-
erty in this state shall front the effective date .of this 
act have a lien against such property for the recovery. 
o~ the antount of the purchase price paid to _the courity. 
therefor to the extent that the county would have a· 
lien prior to the sale by the county, but in no event 
shall the lien be greater than the amount of taxes, in-
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terest, and penalties, or the amount actually paid 
whichever is smaller; provided however, taxes paid by 
the purchaser for subsequent years after the purchase 
from the county shall be included in the amount se-
cured by said lien, which has not already been recov-
ered. Such lien shall have the same priority against 
such property as the lien for the delinquent taxes which 
were liquidated by such purchase except that it shall 
not have preference over any right, title or interest in 
or against such property acquired since the purchase 
of such tax title and prior to the effective date of this 
section for value and without notice and such lien shall 
bear interest at the legal rate for a period of not to ex-
ceed four years. Such lien shall be foreclosed in any 
action wherein the validity of such tax title is deter-
mined. If such lien is not foreclosed at the time of the 
determination of the invaldity of such tax title, any 
later action to foreclose such lien shall be forever 
(barred), provided that where such determination was 
made prior to the effective date of this section such 
action may be commenced at any time within one year 
after such effective date.'' 
This section was apparently passed to ehange the law 
announced by our Supreme Court in Anson v. Ellison, -104 
U. 576, 140 P2d. 653. In that case the plaintiff purchased 
an invalid tax title for $275.58 and took conveyance by quit-
claim deed from Salt Lake County. The tax title being 
held bad, plaintiff claimed a lien for the amount she had 
paid the county and a.Sked that it be foreclosed. The trial 
court denied the relief and on appeal the Supreme Court 
affirmed, saying, among other things: (Pacific Report, 655) 
"We seriously doubt in any event that the plaintiff 
could turn this action to quiet title into an action to 
foreclose a lien, but we lay aside this procedural ques-
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tion and tum to the merits of plaintiff's argument. As 
already pointed out, it is doubtful that the stipulation 
that a certificate of sale had been issued is sufficient 
to show a valid levy and assessment, and a valid lien 
will not arise from an invalid levy and assessment. Al-
though it may be that when a tax is subsequently prop-
erly levied the lien may relate back to the first of Janu-
ary of the year that proper levy should have been 
made.'' 
We seriously doubt that the foregoing statute can con-
vert and change a suit-to-quiet-title into an action to fore-
close a tax lien without doing violence to the constitutional 
guarantee of due process of law. In a.ily event, after giv-
ing this section full effect, it does not give plaintiffs the 
right to foreclose tax liens in the instant case. It should 
be noted that the said law contains the provision that ev-
ery person who purchases an invalid tax title: 
''. . . shall · . . . have a lien against such 
propety for the recovery of the amount of the pur-
chase price paid· to the county therefor to the extent 
that the county would have a lien prior to the sale by 
the COWlty . • • ." 
Th~s, plaintiffs' right to a lien is conditioned on whether 
or not the county had a lien prior to the sale to them and 
only to that extent. The nature and extent of the county's 
tax lien is provided for in 59-10-3, U. C. A., 1953, as follows: 
''Every tax upon real property is a lien against 
the property assessed; and every tax due upon improve-
ments upon real estate assessed to others than the 
owner of real estate is a lien upon the land and im-
provements; which several liens attach as of the 1st 
day in January of each year." 
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In Anson v. Ellison, supra, this section was interpreted 
and it was there held that "a valid lien will not arise from 
an invalid levy and assessment." Only lands that are law-
fully assessed give rise to valid tax liens. The disputed lands 
were not lawfully assessed, and even if all levy and assess-
ment steps had been taken, as provided by law, no tax lien 
could possibly arise in favor of the county, or at all. As 
was held in Plutus Mining Co. v. O.rme, 76 U. 286, 289 P. 
132, where the assessed property was not within the limits 
of the taxing authority the assessment is unlawful and in-
valid. As already indicated above, the disputed lands were 
unpatented Utah Lake accretion lands. The first assess-
ment ever made thereon seems to have been for the year 
1914 (Plaintiffs' Exhibits A, B, and C), indicating that 
some 30 years elapsed after the conveyance of Simon P. Eg-
gertson to George T. Peay before an attempt to assess them 
was made. The land described in the said Eggertson-Peay 
deed seems to be the only accretion ground ever to be as-
sessed in the area. This is perhaps because either (1) it 
was supposed to be United States land, or (2) it was thought 
to be U'tah State land, or (3) it was accretion ground and 
not productive because submerged so much of the time. 
When Utah became a state its inhabitants disclaimed all 
right, title, and interest in unappropriated public lands with-
in its boundary, leaving such lands in the ownership of the 
United States. (Constitution of Utah, Article ill, Second). 
The property of the United States, or of this State, is ex;. 
empt from taxation. (59-2-1, U. C. A., 1953). These dis-
puted lands were unappropriated public lands, and the Eg-
gertson attempt to convey them to Peay was abortive and 
a nullity, as was the subsequent attempt to assess and tax 
same. Utah County acquired no lien by virtue of t})e in-
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valid proceedings in these cases. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 
liens claimed under 59-10-65 must fail. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL CO·URT CO·RRECTLY 
FOUND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND QUIETED 
THEIR TITLE TO THE DISPUTED LANDS. 
(a) Defendants' Record Title To Adjacent Patented 
Lands Entitled Them To The iDisputed Lands Under The 
Accretion Doctrine. 
It is undisputed that the defendants have the record 
titl~ to the patented lands lying North of the Meander Line 
and ~h the North boundary of the disputed lands. Title to 
same has descended to defendants by mesne conveyances 
from Simon P. Eggertson, patentee. We take the position 
that such ownership carried with it ownership of the accre-
tion lands to the high water mark at Statehood. Provo City 
v. Jacobson, U. __ ~, 217 P2d. 577. No one makes 
a claim here, nor is there any proof, that the State had title 
to the disputed lands at Statehood. Therefore, the defend-
ants ·by reason of their ownership of the patented lands own 
the disputed lands to the water's edge. The above men-
tioned Eggertson's heirs deed shows their recognition of 
defendants' and their predecessor,s' patented ground title 
to the Meander Line. Thus, defendants' record title to the 
said patented ground amply sustains their right to the own-
ership of the disputed lands. 
(b) Defendants Acquired Title To The Disputed Lands 
By Adverse Possession Thereof For Upwards Of 50 Years. 
But apart from their said record ownership of the dis-
puted _lands, defendants have acquired title thereto by ad-
verse possession. The defendants' predecessor, Tho1nas L. 
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Vincent, took possession of the disputed lands under writ-
ten instruments in 1884, 1892, and 1898 (Defendants' Ex-
hibit 4, Entry 5, and Exhibit 5, Entries 5 and 6), and ever 
since then he and his successors in title, including the de-
fendants, have continuously occupied same under claim of 
right, fenced, cultivated, cropped, pastured, and adversely 
held same against all the \Vorld and paid all taxes lawfully 
assessed against same. All the requirements as to adverse 
possession under written instruments, as provided for in 
Section 78-12-9, U. C. A., 1953, have been met and complied 
with by the defendants and their predecessors for more 
than seven years before the filing of the defendants' coun-
terclaims. Indeed, for upwards of 50 years the defendants 
and their predecessors (1) have usually cultivated and im-
proved the disputed lands and (2) have built and protected 
same by a substantial enclosure. 
Also, the defendants and their predecessors have met 
all requirements as to adverse possesion, even if their claim 
were not founded upon a written instrument, as required 
by Section 78-12-11, U. C. A., 1953. The record shows that 
the defendants and their predecessors for upwards of 50· 
years have ( 1) protected the disputed lands in their posses-
sion by a substantial enclosure consisting of fences, (2) that 
all during said period these lands have been usually culti-
vated and improved by them, and (3) labor and money have 
been expended for the purpose of irrigating and draining 
the said lands in a sum amounting to more than $5.00 per 
acre, as hereinabove shown. 
Also, the defendants have fully complied with the pro-
visions of Section 78-12-12, U. C. A., 1953, which provides 
as follows: 
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~·rn no . case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provisions of any section of this 
Code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years con-
tinuously, and that the party, his predecessors and 
grantors have paid all taxes which have been levied 
and assessed upon such land according to law." 
The defendants and their predecessors have continu-
ously and adversely possessed the disputed lands for more 
than seven years, as required by the furegoing statute. 
Furthermore, they have paid all taxes levied and assessed 
against the same ''according to law'', as required thereby. 
There is no provision in our law which permits assessment 
of unpatented lands belonging either to the ,United States 
or the State of Utah. Indeed, the Utah Lake accretion 
groimds generally, other than the George T. Peay lands, 
have never been assessed for taxation purposes, and as 
shown by the evidence in. this case, the same are still not 
assessed or taxed. The theory is that due to the rise and 
fall .of the waters of the Lake the accretion lands are ex-
tremely uncertain as to their utility value. The record in 
the instant case shows that they are presently completely . 
submerged by the water of the lake. Over the years the 
assessment and taxing of the patented ground adjacent 
thereto is all that is required of those who possess the ac-
cretion lands bordering same. The fact that an assessment 
was made against the disputed lands does not make such 
assessment valid, and, in fact, results in unlawful assess-
ment. If taxes were not lawfully assessed against these 
lands, then the adverse claimant is not required by the fore-
going section to pay such taxes and may acquire title with-
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out doing so. Utah Copper v. Chandler (1914) 45 U. 85, 
142 P. 1119. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed no error in making its find-
ings, conclusions, and decree in favor of defendants. It is 
abundantly clear from the record in each of the instant 
cases that the claims of the plaintiffs are barred by the stat-
ute of limitations, as above set forth. But apart from that, 
the plaintiffs have failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence, or at all, any record title in themselves. It is fur-
ther established by this record that the plaintiffs' claimed 
tax titles are invalid. And, finally, the disputed lands were 
never assessable. Utah Connty never became entitled to tax 
liens thereon. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled 
to liens for the amounts paid the County for same. The 
evidence overwhelmingly establishes that the defendants 
own the disputed lands (1) because they are the record 
owners of the patented grounds to which the disputed lands 
attach, and (2) if such were not the fact, defendants have 
acquired title to same by adverse possession. Defendants 
have been rightfully adjudged by the lower court to be the 
owners of the said lands and to have their title thereto 
quieted, and the judgment of the lower court should be af-
firmed. 
GEORGE S. BALLIF, 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
Suite 211, Knight Block, 
Provo, ·Utah. 
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